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Abstract 
Software applications become highly distributed and complex, involving independent collaborating components 
working towards achieving system goals. At the same time, security attacks against these applications have also 
grown being more sophisticated and are quite difficult to detect and withstand, especially distributed attacks. In 
this paper, we argue that one way to identify and mitigate such attacks is through the trust-based collaboration 
of application components. However, to achieve collaborative defense in distributed environments, a common 
vocabulary is needed for the components to collaborate with each other in identifying security incidents. Thus, 
we employ an ontological approach to define security ontologies as a common vocabulary that is 
understandable for both humans and software agents. Further, we introduce basic security concepts and trust 
implications, explain our security ontologies (specified in OWL) that include the security asset-vulnerability 
ontology (SAVO), the security algorithm-standard ontology (SASO), the security function ontology (SFO), and 
the security attack and defence ontologies (SAO and SDO respectively). Trust is also examined while its 
dimensions are employed to create trust-based communications used to distribute security ontologies. We use a 
case study involving Mitnick attacks to demonstrate our approach.  
Keywords 
Information security, Security ontology, Security attacks, Security defenses, Trust. 
Introduction 
Software applications become highly distributed and increasingly complicated, implicating various components 
that collaborate with each other in order to achieve system objectives. Simultaneously, attackers become smarter 
in creating new types of attacks, especially distributed attacks, which are quite difficult to identify and mitigate. 
Thus, we argue that it is possible to detect and resist against such distributed attacks through the collaboration of 
a system’s constituent components. However, to achieve collaborative defense in distributed environments such 
components should have a common vocabulary to allow them to communicate with each other regarding 
security attacks and countermeasures in a trusted way. For such purpose, we employ an ontological approach 
that allows sharing a common understanding of information about information security (security attacks and 
defences, in particular) among both humans and software agents. 
In recent years the development of ontologies, explicit formal specifications of the terms in the domain and 
relations among them, has been moving from the realm of Artificial-Intelligence laboratories to the desktops of 
domain experts (Noy & McGuinness 2007). Such practice of applying ontologies has become a very wide and 
common fact on the World Wide Web. For example, the WWW Consortium (W3C) has developed the Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) (Brickley & Guha 1999), a language for encoding knowledge on Web pages to 
make them understandable to electronic agents searching for information. Then, the Defence Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) in conjunction with the W3C have developed DARPA Agent Markup Language 
(DAML) and its successor Web Ontology Language (OWL) through extending RDF with more expressive 
constructs aimed to facilitate agent interaction on the Web (Hendler & McGuinness 2000). Thus, many 
disciplines now develop standardized ontologies that domain experts can use to share and annotate information 
in their fields. For instance, medicine can explicitly be taken as an example that has produced large standardized 
structured vocabularies such as SNOMED (Price & Spackman 2000). So, any ontology defines a common 
vocabulary for domain experts who need to share information in the domain that encompasses machine-
interpretable definitions of basic concepts within this domain and relations among them.  
In this paper, a number of security ontologies is given with one of the purposes to depict an overall picture of the 
field of information security that covers basic security concepts such as attacks, assets, functions, vulnerabilities, 
security algorithms, etc. Besides, these security ontologies might be very helpful for information security 
researchers and experts. Moreover, we suggest that the proposed security ontologies could be practically justified 
and commonly utilised as guidelines to better protect an organization’s computer environment against various 
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security incidents. However, once we agree to rely on such guidelines, we should think to what degree trust 
should be spread out and how to guarantee trust-based collaboration among different parties. Therefore, we 
employ security ontologies for such purposes and verify how trust might affect them. Consequently, two types of 
trust are considered in this paper: technology trust and relationship trust. More specifically, trust in the context of 
information security is evidenced in two domains of the dependencies: (1) trust in the technology that serves as a 
transmission medium for transferring data flow or interaction among software agents, i.e. technology trust, and 
(2) trust among partners (agents), i.e. relationship trust (Ratnasingam 2005). Overall, the bottom line of the paper 
is to enable trust-based collaboration among humans or software agents through exploiting security ontologies as 
a common vocabulary in order to resist and mitigate security attacks. Finally, we specify our ontologies in OWL 
and demonstrate them through the use of an example involving the Mitnick attack. In conclusion, we outline 
directions for future research.  
Theoretical Background and Motivation 
Related Works 
Currently, there are a few approaches that allow publishing semantic data including OWL (OWL 2007), OWL-S 
(OWL-S 2007), Semantic Web Services Language (SWSL) (SWSL 2007), etc. However, none of them is 
designed specifically to express security issues. Besides, there are only few works in the area of security 
ontologies. One of them (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005) introduces the NRL ontology that describes types of security 
information including security mechanisms, protocols, algorithms, objectives, and credentials. While it is based 
on the work done by Denker, Nguyen, & Ton (2004), it expresses security related information not only for Web 
Services but for all types of resources as well. Further, a number of studies have identified a lack of trust as one 
of the main possible constraints in the area of information security, particularly in terms of data protection, its 
secure delivery and other issues that focus on three main aspects of trust in data transactions: identity, privacy 
and security (Guerra & Zizzo 2003). Although, there are plenty of works done in the every single area of 
information security that somehow explores trust implications. However, none of the existed literature provides 
any information about how trust might influence on collaboration of distributed parties, i.e. whether security 
system (that utilise security ontologies) might be enhanced by the adoption of certain strategies designed to 
enhance trust-based collaboration. To be more consistent, take for example e-business area, the research in this 
area has been investigating trust implications for a number of years. And as the result, a variety of strategies to 
enhance trust in e-commerce have been developed, where four of them were best suited to meet demands of the 
information economy: identity establishment, third-party certification, loss insurance and legal frameworks 
(Guerra & Zizzo 2003). Finally, our security ontologies are more intuitive to understand and more complete than 
other security ontologies (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005; Denker, Nguyen & Ton 2004; Undercoffer et al. 2004; 
Martimiano & Moreira 2006; Seacord & Householder 2005). 
Motivation of Research 
Software systems become increasingly distributed that involve many independent and collaborating components 
working towards to achieve certain system objectives. Simultaneously, attackers become smarter in creating 
more sophisticated security attacks, especially distributed attacks. In order to detect and withstand such attacks, 
system components should collaborate and communicate with each other by sharing a common vocabulary. In 
our case, such vocabulary is based on the proposed security ontologies distributed among components in a 
trusted way. Further, the ontologies define the security concepts and their dependencies comprehensible to both 
humans and software agents. Additionally, the proposed approach comprises a factor of trust as one of the 
elements that impact on the collaboration among components within software systems.  
Security Ontologies 
Introduction 
The following definition of the term “ontology” is extracted from Uschold, Moralee & Zorgios (1998): “An 
ontology may take a variety of forms, but necessarily it will include a vocabulary of terms, and some 
specification of their meaning. This includes definitions and an indication of how concepts are inter-related 
which collectively impose a structure on the domain and constrain the possible interpretations of terms.” In other 
words, ontologies allow sharing common understanding of the structure of information among both people and 
software agents (Noy & McGuinness 2007).  
Currently, many research works have applied an ontological approach to different knowledge domains due to 
their several advantages over other classifications such as taxonomies. The reasons of so much popularity of an 
ontological approach are provided as follows: 
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• Ontologies specify many semantic relationships between various entities while a standard taxonomy has 
only three relationships; 
• Ontologies share a common understanding of structured information among different parties such as 
humans or software agents which in turn, can be reasoned and analysed automatically; 
• Ontologies are reusable and able to evolve over time; 
• Ontologies are shared among different parties to solve interoperability problems. 
Our main ontology is called Security Asset-Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO) that illustrates how attacks against 
peers (hosts) may affect their assets protected by defensive mechanisms; how vulnerabilities are exploited by 
threat agents in order to perform attacks; and how assets are evaluated by using the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. SAVO is the main security ontology that binds other security concepts, mechanisms and ontologies 
including the security attack ontology (SAO), the security defence ontology (SDO), the security algorithm-
standard ontology (SASO), and the security function ontology (SFO). Besides, these security ontologies depict 
the situation with various information security-related issues and assist software developers to create the more 
efficient protection against attacks and system failures in terms of money and time. Further, SAVO can be 
utilized as a common vocabulary by various defensive components (e.g. intrusion detection components) in 
order to interact with each other, share a common understanding of information about security attacks, and 
ensure better protection. Also, SAO correlates closely with SDO, which is mainly used to specify certain 
defensive mechanisms, resist against security attacks, and reveal dependencies among security algorithms and 
standards expressed in SASO and SFO.  
The Security Asset-Vulnerability Ontology (SAVO) 
In this section, we briefly introduce several security terms used in our ontologies and explain their relations, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. However, we would like to note that due to the limit of space, descriptions of some of 
security concepts can be found in the work written by Stewart, Tittel & Chapple (2005). 
SAVO is considered to be the main among all security ontologies that incorporates other our security ontologies 
including SASO, SAFO, SAO, and SDO. Similarly, SAVO (as other our security ontologies) is designed to 
support several features as the NLR ontology (Kim, Luo & Kang 2005) such as (1) the ability to specify security 
information for different types of resources and environments; (2) the reusability and extensibility; and (3) 
mapping between high-level and low-level security requirements and capabilities. Thus, SAVO is a high level 
security ontology that depicts information security in a simplified manner especially for non-security 
professionals, and its design is based upon our expertise and knowledge of information security. SAVO relates 
to some research works done in information security area (Stewart, Tittel & Chapple 2005; Kim, Luo & Kang 
2005; Denker, Nguyen & Ton 2004; Undercoffer et al. 2004; Martimiano & Moreira 2006; Seacord & 
Householder 2005). 
First, we introduce several security terms crucial for better understanding of the given information. The full 
description of security terms can be found in Stewart, Tittel & Chapple (2005). We start with the term ‘threat’ 
(the class ‘Threat’ in Figure 1) that refers to any occurrence that may cause any unwanted outcome for a 
company. A threat agent (the class ‘ThreatAgent’) is an agent that can use a threat in order to exploit 
vulnerability, while vulnerability (the class ‘Vulnerability’) in turn is the absence or the weakness of defence 
(e.g. error, flaw, etc). Risk (the class ‘Risk’) is the possibility that a threat agent will exploit vulnerability to 
damage an asset whereas exposure (the class ‘Exposure’) reveals the possibility that vulnerability will be 
exploited by a threat agent. Besides, vulnerability may also result in exposure, every instance of which equals 
risk that can be mitigated by using a safeguard (the class ‘Defence’). On the other hand, a safeguard is utilised to 
resist attacks (the class ‘Attack’) and applies security techniques and mechanisms (the classes ‘SecurityFunction’ 
and ‘SecurityAlgorithmStandard’). Now, we can proceed further with the terms such as ‘asset’ that refers to 
anything within any environment that should be protected, i.e. data (the class ‘Data’), software (the class 
‘Software’), accounts (the class ‘Account’), resources (the class ‘Resource’), etc. Then, the class ‘Asset’ also can 
be subdivided into subclasses including but not limited to ‘ClientData’ and ‘SystemData’  (both refer to client 
and system data); ‘Component’ and ‘Service’ (refer to software implementation) while such subclasses as 
‘CPU’, ‘Memory’ and ‘Storage’ encompass available resources; ‘ClientAccount’ and ‘SystemAccount’ are 
subclasses of the class ‘Account’. Further, any asset may contain vulnerability which is explored with other 
vulnerabilities. The class ‘Vulnerability’ has three properties, vulnerability name (the class ‘VulnName’), an 
attribute (the class ‘VulnAttribute’) and associated values (the class ‘VulnValue’). Then, a patch (the class 
‘Patch’) removes vulnerability and is developed by a supplier (the class ‘Supplier’). Whereas a threat agent may 
use a threat to perform an attack (the class ‘Attack’) and endanger the asset, it also exploits vulnerability for 
attacking a peer (the class ‘Peer’) that hosts the assets (in our case, a peer is a victim of an attack). 
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Figure 1: The security asset-vulnerability ontology 
Moreover, any occurred attack leads to security event (the class ‘SecurityEvent’) which can precede another one 
and which, in turn, has a precondition (the class ‘Precondition’) that relates to vulnerability. Such security event 
is likely to be caused by a system failure (the class ‘Failure’) and it also may affect an asset and result in a 
consequence (the class ‘Consequence’) which in turn, affects an asset either. And this resulted consequence has a 
number of subclasses such as destruction of data (the class ‘DataAnnihilation’), an information leakage (the 
class ‘InformationLeakage’), an illegal access (the class ‘IllegalAccess’) or a DoS attack (the class ‘DoSAttack’). 
In addition, any asset has a value (the class ‘AssetValue’) that might be estimated through exploiting both the 
quantitative risk analysis (the class ‘QuantitativeRiskAnalysis’) and the qualitative risk analysis (the class 
‘QualitativeRiskAnalysis’). The quantitative risk analysis allows to estimate a concrete probability percentage. 
There are few formulas associated with the quantitative risk analysis: 
• The exposure factor (EF) shows the percentage of loss that a company experiences if a certain asset is 
violated by a realized risk. This exposure factor is expressed in percentage (%); 
• The single loss expectancy (SLE) is the cost of loss calculated using the formula. SLE is expressed in a 
money value ($) and is calculated using the following formula:  
SLE [$] =AV * EF; where AV – asset value; 
• The annualised rate of occurrence (ARO) is the expected frequency of certain risk or threat occurring 
within one year. ARO is expressed utilizing the following formula:  
ARO= Qo ⁄ year; where Qo – quantity of occurrence; 
• The annualised loss expectancy (ALE) is the possible cost per year of all instances of a certain realised 
threat against a certain asset. ALE is counted using the following formula:  
ALE=SLE*ARO=AV*EF*ARO 
The pure quantitative analysis is not possible because some aspects of information security cannot be quantified 
in money figures. While the qualitative risk analysis usually goes hand in hand with the appliance of such factors 
as experience, judgment, intuition, and so on.  
To conclude, SAVO is easily modifiable and extendable via adding supplementary subclasses.  
The Security Algorithm-Standard Ontology (SASO) 
This section of the paper aims to introduce the Security Algorithm-Standard Ontology (SASO) which 
encompasses security algorithms, standards, concepts, credentials, objectives, assurance levels, etc. Moreover, 
these security terms are classes of ontology and currently utilised as “building blocks” for other ontologies 
including the Security Function Ontology (SFO).  
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SASO consists of several classes including ‘SecurityAlgorithm’, ‘SecurityConcept’, ‘SecurityAssurance’, 
‘SecurityCredential’, and ‘SecurityObjective’. The class ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ is utilised to define various security 
algorithms. The structure of this class is illustrated in Figure 2, where the main class called ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ 
has three major subclasses including ‘SAlgEncryption’, ‘SAlgSignature’, and ‘SAlgKeyExchange’. The class 
‘SAlgEncryption’ defines classes that deliver encryption/decryption capabilities and consists of two subclasses 
(the classes ‘SAlgSymmetric’ and ‘SAlgAsymmetric’) that represent symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic 
algorithms. Then, the class ‘SAlgKeyExchange’ specifies cryptographic key exchange algorithms while the class 
‘SAlgSignature’ includes classes responsible for digital signatures and cryptographic hash functions. 
 
Figure 2: The class SecurityAlgorithm 
The class ‘SecurityConcept’ consists of three subclasses (not illustrated here due to limited space) that involve 
the subclasses named as ‘SConMechanism’, ‘SConProtocol’ and ‘SConSecurityPolicy’ consequently. We inherit 
the similar structure as in the class ‘SecurityConcept’ of the main security ontology extracted from Kim, Luo & 
Kang (2005). Moreover, there is a difference between security protocols and security mechanisms, where the 
former (the class ‘SConProtocol’) defines how to fulfil certain tasks using certain steps while the latter (the class 
‘SConMechanism’) is an implementation of security protocols. The class ‘SConMechanism’ mainly defines 
various types of firewalls, proxies and virtual machines (VMs) while the class ‘SConProtocol’ has many 
subclasses that specify different security protocols being used in authentication (the class ‘SConAuthentication’), 
encryption (the class ‘SConEncryption’), key management (the class ‘SConKeyMngmt’), digital signatures (the 
class ‘SConSignature’), secure e-mail systems (the class ‘SConEmail’), and secure communications (the class 
‘SConSecureCommunication’). The class ‘SConSecurityPolicy’ describes rules and policies used in access 
control models. The class ‘SecurityAssurance’ (not illustrated here) specifies assurance methods for security 
algorithms, protocols, and mechanisms. Currently, it has only one subclass called ‘CommonCriteria’ (CC) (CC 
IS 2007), which is an international standard for a computer security evaluation and which is used to evaluate 
security measures applied to software applications. Given the extensibility of our ontology, new classes such as 
‘TCSEC’ (Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria) can be easily added. The class ‘SecurityCredential’ is 
commonly used for identification and authentication purposes. Finally, the class ‘SecurityObjective’ (not 
illustrated here also due to limited space) is used to define security objectives including confidentiality, 
authorisation, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, authenticity, auditability, identification, accountability, and 
survivability. Some of them are related to trust issues and considered to be dimensions of the technology trust 
(see our example). 
The Security Function Ontology (SFO) 
The main objective of this section is to introduce the Security Function Ontology (SFO) that is widely applied in 
conjunction with SASO to provide a vocabulary for our ontologies and for SCL (Security Characterisation 
Language) (Khan & Han 2003; Khan 2005) and Extended SCL (ESCL) (Vorobiev & Han 2006b) in particular. 
The classes ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ and ‘SecurityConcept’ are used as SCL/ESCL function parameters and utilised 
for further analysis and reasoning of those security functions applied to specify the security interface of 
components and services. The main class of SFO is called ‘SecurityFunction’ which contains six classes of 
security functions derived from merging eleven Common Criteria classes: ‘CryptoSupportFunc’, 
‘IdentificationAuthorisationFunc’, ‘PrivacyFunc’, ‘UserDataProtectionFunc’, ‘TrustedChannelFunc’, and 
‘SecurityAuditResourceUtilisationFunc’. There are also additional classes including but not limited to ‘Time’, 
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‘Probability’ and ‘SecProp’, where the latter refers to the class of security properties. The class of security 
functions for cryptographic support (the class ‘CryptoSupportFunc’) is designed to support 
encryption/decryption algorithms. Security functions or their sets assure certain security goals such as 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc. The class ‘SecurityEntity’ just binds various security entities used in 
SFO such as cryptographic keys or certificates. To be more precise, we provide a brief example illustrated in 
Figure 3:  
 
Figure 3: An example with the function Signed (X, K-1) 
Initially, there are about forty four security functions that are not presented here due to limited space.  
Relationships among Security Classes 
In this section, we describe relationships among different security classes of SASO and SFO, as illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Relations between various security concepts 
As shown above, the main class of SFO is the class ‘SecurityFunction’ that consists of six subclasses introduced 
in the previous sections. All these subclasses encompass security functions with the property named as 
‘hasSecParams’ that in turn, contains the classes ‘SecurityConcept’ (SASO), ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ (SASO), and 
‘SecurityEntity’ as values. These three classes are used as values since they define security algorithms and 
standards as well as security entities such as cryptographic keys or operations. Moreover, such classes as ‘Time’ 
and ‘Probability’ may be utilised via the class ‘SecurityFunction’ and its subclasses in order to specify security 
of software systems. Since, many security algorithms and concepts have various assurance levels and use 
security credentials for access control, some of the SASO classes (the classes ‘SecurityConcept’ and 
‘SecurityAlgorithm’) have two properties, among those are ‘hasSecCredential’ and ‘hasSecAssurance’ which 
have classes ‘SecurityCredential’ and ‘SecurityAssurance’ as values accordingly. The classes 
‘SecurityFunction’, ‘SecurityConcept’, ‘SecurityAlgorithm’ and combinations of their subclasses guarantee 
security objectives predefined by the class ‘SecurityObjective’.  
The Security Attack and Defence Ontologies (SAO and SDO) 
In this section, we define the Security Attack Ontology (SAO) and the Security Defence Ontology (SDO) used 
as a common vocabulary by software agents (e.g. a coalition of defensive components) or humans. Defensive 
components (DCs) (e.g. intrusion detection components or honey-pots) and humans use SAO and SDO to 
interact with each other and share a common understanding of information about security attacks and defenses. 
Both SAO and SDO have the ability to evolve over time.  
As illustrated in Figure 5, once a DC from a coalition detects a new attack it adds the attack as a new class to 
SAO and shares the ontology with other members of the coalition. When any coalition member develops a 
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countermeasure against this attack a countermeasure is added to SDO as a new class which is then distributed 
among other coalition members. Additionally, many attacks especially distributed multi-phased attacks such as 
the Mitnick attack (Undercoffer et al. 2004) can be detected by such coalitions.   
 
Figure 5: An illustrated example  
The main SAO class called ‘Attack’, has five subclasses (not illustrated here) ‘WSAttack’, ‘P2PAttack’, 
‘DoSAttack’, ‘SniffingAttack’, and the class called ‘MultiPhasedDistributedAttack’. The class ‘WSAttack’ 
defines attacks on Web services (WS) (Vorobiev & Han 2006a; Stamos & Stender 2005) while the class 
‘P2Pattack’ specifies attacks on the peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. The class ‘DoSAttack’ describes various denial 
of service attacks. Attacks on communication channels are characterized by the class ‘SniffingAttack’. So that, 
Mitnick attack is an explicit example of multi-phased distributed attacks (Undercoffer et al. 2004), which in turn, 
is the subclass of the class ‘MultiPhasedDistributedAttack’ performed through utilising attacks from the classes 
‘DoSAttack’, ‘WSAttack’, and ‘SniffingAttack’. The class ‘Attack’ has a property called ‘hasRelation’ which 
binds the class ‘Defence’. The class hierarchy of SDO is quite similar to SAO. The main SDO class is called 
‘Defence’ and it has five subclasses correlated with five SAO classes including defence against attacks on Web 
services (the class ‘WSDefence’) and P2P systems (the class ‘P2PDefence’), safeguards against DoS attacks (the 
class ‘DoSDefence’), countermeasures against sniffing attacks (the class ‘SniffingDefence’) and multi-phased 
distributed attacks (the class ‘MultiPhasedDistributedDefence’). The class ‘Attack’ has the following two 
properties named as ‘hasRelation’ (tied to the class ‘Attack’) and ‘hasDescription’ that utilises SASO and SFO 
described in the previous sections. Alas, the detailed description of SAO and SDO ontologies is out of the scope 
of this paper. 
Trust 
In this section, we give an introductory word about trust, without which security ontologies cannot be distributed 
among various parties in a secured and trusted way. Trust has been studied at length in many disciplines. Pettit 
(1995) makes a distinction between the attribute of trust and the behaviour of trust. Misztal (1996) identifies 
different types of trust according their role: commercial, problem solving, informational, knowledge and 
identity; while Kini & Choobineh (1998) make a distinction from three different perspectives on trust: 
individual, societal and relationship. And as no consensus has emerged on what trust means, this paper begins 
with narrowing concepts of trust within information security. Once security ontologies have been specified, trust 
is expected to include high-level of assurance, reliability and confidentiality. Trust has the ability to evolve and 
thus, it has different levels: technical level that mainly is supported by security algorithms and cryptography; and 
relationship level, i.e. non-technical that includes humans to interact and communicate, however the latter is out 
of the scope of this paper.  
Technology trust is supported by security technologies embedded in standardized interaction processes. The 
foundations of technology trust are technical safeguards, protective measures, and access control mechanisms 
that aim to provide reliable transactions, data flows, and detective mechanisms. Trust is formed among different 
parties through the use of various policies (e.g. security policies). Dimensions of technology trust may include 
security services which examine confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation, and access controls 
(Ratnasingam 2005). In other words, in the frame of our security ontology there is a coalition of members that 
includes both humans and software agents. To securely distribute security ontologies among coalition members 
these ontologies should be encrypted. For example, AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) (Stewart, Tittel & 
Chapple 2005) can be applied here. Similar to most symmetric cryptography algorithms, AES delivers 
confidentiality. Then, an encrypted ontology should be digitally signed and hence, these digital signatures 
support integrity, non-repudiation, and authentication. Thus, such characteristics of security services include 
technical solutions that serve to support availability, confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and accountability of 
any transactions.  
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Relationship trust enforces governance mechanisms to apply in the form of contracts, regular audit policies, top 
management commitment, quality standards, awareness training, and risks management procedures that impact 
and control data flows. Initially, relationship trust came from social and organizational studies and thus, it 
encompasses interpersonal or social aspects of relationships that involve humans. In our case, such kind of trust 
exists among different parties that collectively assess transactions occurred according to their expectations. 
Dimensions of relationship trust may include competence trust, predictability trust, and goodwill trust that 
primarily focuses on humans’ behaviour. But due to limited space, we are unable to give a comprehensive report 
on every type of trust, however, the detailed picture can be found in a number of works (Ratnasingam 2005; 
Guerra & Zizzo 2003).  
Example 
We choose an example that illustrates how our security ontologies might be utilised in distributed environment 
and how trust might be employed. Initially, we take two hosts, Peer 1 (P1) and Peer 2 (P2), that are members of 
a coalition and which help each other to detect and mitigate various types of security attacks performed by an 
Attacker (A). Some of these attacks are possible to detect only by several coalition members that are distributed 
over the network and cooperate with each other. One of such attacks is the Mitnick attack modified via the use of 
Web services (WSs). 
First, A performs the WS Mitnick attack that exploits weakness of the TCP protocol design in making a TCP 
connection called the three-way handshake, as illustrated in Appendix. Then, P1 sends a SYN packet to P2 to 
initiate a TCP connection. In turn, P2 sends a SYN/ACK packet to establish a TCP connection with P1. Finally, 
to establish a TCP connection and complete the handshake P1 receives a SYN/ACK packet and sends an 
acknowledgment message (a SYN/ACK packet) to P2.  
Second, in order to detect the WS Mitnick attack, P1 and P2 should operate as the coalition. If P1 detects the 
SYN/Flood attack, it will send a description of the attack to P2’s using our security ontology. To ensure that new 
security ontology can be trusted, P1 encrypts it using the AES algorithm that supports confidentiality. Further, 
P1 signs the ontology and puts a timestamp to provide integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation using RSA 
and SHA-256 cryptographic algorithms.  
Third, A tries to intercept this ontology and modify it. If A is successful, then A will try to crack the protected 
ontology which is difficult since it was encrypted, signed and timestamped.  
Fourth, A can try other ways to create a malicious ontology. A can apply social engineering techniques and 
enforce P2 to install a Trojan horse which helps to steal a private key.  
Fifth, P2 does not know that it has been cracked; however, P1 suggests that something wrong is occurring.  
Finally, P1 and P2 cannot deliver trust by technical mechanisms and therefore, they have to apply non-technical 
means such as interpersonal communication channels (contracts, policies, conferences, meetings, awareness 
trainings, etc).  
Conclusion and Further Research 
Currently, users of software applications require more features, flexibility and better protection. Hence, such 
applications become highly complicated and distributed containing many various independent components. At 
the same time, new attacks, especially distributed multi-phased attacks, which are quite difficult to identify and 
mitigate, appear.  
In this paper, we have demonstrated that only through the collaboration of a system’s constituent components is 
possible to detect and withstand such attacks. However, components should have a common basis (vocabulary) 
to allow them to exchange information with each other about security threats in a trusted way. Therefore, we 
have utilised an ontological approach to specify information security issues in a way understandable to both 
humans and software agents. Besides, we have analysed reasons why ontologies were selected. Moreover, we 
have introduced various security terms, concepts and mechanisms through the specified security ontologies 
including SASO, SFO, SAO, SDO, and SAVO, where the latter is a high-level ontology that binds other security 
ontologies that all are employed as the common vocabulary. Additionally, technology trust and relationship trust 
have been also introduced in the paper. However, this paper focuses mainly on technology trust. Further, the 
proposed security ontologies have been specified in OWL and the example with the Mitnick attack has been 
given to illustrate how security mechanisms allow trust-based exchange of security ontologies among different 
parties.  
In future work, we will develop more comprehensive security ontologies, specify trust ontologies and investigate 
how trust might impact on information security.   
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